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INTRODUCTION 
Our purpose in this thesis is not to place John Locke and 
St. Thomas Aquinas on the same hi~1 plane. For certainly the 
philosophy of Locke, which competent historians have termed 
1 2 3 
"superficial", "inconsistent", and "devoid of force", is not 
·worthy of the same merit as that of the Angel of the Schools, 
who has been aptly styled, "the norm for philosophersn, by so 
many. 
On the other hand, it must be admitted that Locke's phil-
osophy has been very influential, especially in .tmglish and 
American philosophy, and particulary in the fields of ~pistem­
ology and Psychology. A per·fect understanding of modern .l:!.nglish 
and American thought supposes a knowledge of Locke's philosophy. 
As Aristotle says: "He who considers things in their growth 
and origin will obtain the clearest view of them." It is worthy 
of study, therefore, to view these teachings of Locke, not in 
themselves, but alongside the doctrine of St. Thomas, which has 
stood the test of time, and is so consonant with revealed truths 
our method of approach will be patterned after that of 
St. Thomas. ~t is his way, first, to set down the views of his 
adversaries, next to pr·esent his own views, and then to answer 
the opponents by comparison and criticism. Our thesis will con-
sider both the Sensism and Attempted Realism of Locke, which 
necessitates a twofold pBrtit~on of the work. 
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In each section we shall set forth Locke's doctrine, next 
Aquinas' views, and finally our critique presented in the light 
of 'l'homistic doctrine. 
VJe have intended the chief characteristic of this work to 
be the fact that the criticisms are based principally on a 
parallelism of text. 'l'hus in the third and sixth chapters mmy 
criticisms of Locke's Sensism and Attemped Realism have not been 
mentioned, since they have been brought forward by Saint Thomas 1 
own words cited in preceding chapters. 
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,Section I Sensism of Locke 
Chapter I 
AN EXPOSITION OF LOCKE'S SENSISM 
By Sensism here we intend that system of philosophy which 
so analyzes the cognoscitive processes of man as to reduce all 
faculties to the level of the senses. Such a system puts man 
on the same plane as the animal as regards knowledge. In the 
present chapter we purpose to Show that such was Locke's analy-
sis of man's cognoscitive powers. 
The first intimation of Locke•s Sensism is found in his def-
inition of "idea", one that is, to say the leas·t, very vague and 
slipshod. 
In his Introduction to the ~ssay he writes: 
"Before I proceed on to what I have thought 
of on this subject, I must here, in the en-
trance, beg pardon of my reader for the fre-
quent use of the word, nidea", which he will 
find in the following treatise, it being that 
term, which I think, serves best to stand for 
whatsoever is the object of the understanding 
when a man thinks. I have used it to express 
whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, 
or whatever it is which the mind can be em-
ployed about in thinking: a~d I could not 
avoid frequently using it. n 
1Ne could call attention, here, to the idealism implied in such 
a definition. But since in this chapter we are treating only 
of sensism we shall leave that for a later one. Our point is 
this. Locke, in this definition, does not aistinguish between 
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the notion and the image. Since the image is always of the 
singular, and the notion of the universal, they are not precis-
ely given the common name of idea. But yet this is what Locke 
does. Such a definition shows confusion of intellect and sense, 
which justifies us in saying that Locke at the very outset of 
his treatise on knowledge intimates the sensism which in the 
course of his .t!;ssay becomes more and more explicit. 
A modern scholastic critic of the same definition clearly 
corrobrates our interpretation of the said definition: 
"It would be just as appropriate to call an 
ox an mgel as to call a nphantasm" and "idea". 
To call a concept or notion of the intellect, 
and a phantasm of the imagination, two things 
so totally different in their natures, by the 
same te.rm --idea-- is an indication at the 
very threshold of his philosophy to confound 
intellect with sense, and to Illike man a mere 
glorified animal. So many outstanding phil-
osophers of the ages -- Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, 
Descartes, Leibniz and eveg Kant -- were never 
guilty of this confusion." 
But let us proceed to Locke's analysis of our cognoscitive 
powers. It is in the second book of the ~ssay that Locke pro-
poses to himself the question: 
"How comes the mind to be furnished with ideas~6 nTo this I answer in one word from Experience." 
But what does Locke intend by experience? For him, as he 
clearly explains, experience is twofold: sensation and reflec-
tion. By sensation he means the perception of external phen-
omena, by reflection the perception of internal phenomena. 
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or the operations of the mind. Locke is very insistent that 
these two, sensation and reflection, are the only sources of 
knowledge which we possess. 
Again: 
Once More: 
"These two are the fountains of all knowledge, 
from whence all the ideas we have, or can 
naturally have, do spring.n7 
"These two, I say, viz., external things as 
the objects of sensation, ~d the operations 
of our minds within, as the objects of Re-
flection are to me the only originals from 
whence all our ideas take their beginnings.n8 
"I pretend not to teach but to inquire and 
therefore can not but confess here again 
that external and internal sensation &re 
the only passages that I can find of know-
ledge to the understanding.n9 
The following is still more illustrative of the fact that 
Locke wished to limit all our knowledge to sensation and re-
flection. 
"All those sublime thoughts, which tower 
above the clouds, and reach as high as 
heaven itself, take their rise and foot-
ing here; in all that great extent wherein 
the mind wanders, in those remote specula-
tions it may seem to be elevated with, it 
stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which 
sense or reflection have offered for its 
contemplation.nlO 
In fact at one point Locke challenges his opponents to 
name any other channel whereby he has knowledge outside of 
these two: 
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"Let any one examine his own thoughts, and 
thoroughly search into his understanding: 
and then let him tell me, whether all the 
original ideas he has there, are any other 
than of the objects of his senses, or the 
operations of his mind, considered as ob-jects of reflection. And how great a mass 
of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged 
there, he will, upon taking a strict view, 
see that he has not any ideas in his mind 
but what one of these two have imprinted: -
though perhaps with infinite variety com-
pounded and enlarged by the understanding.nll 
We have been at pains to show that for Locke all the know-
ledge which we possess comes to us by means of these two chan-
nels. Our purpose in stressing this is because later we shall 
prove that all such knowledge attained in the Lockian fashion 
is sense knov.-ledge. Since this is all of our knowledge, we 
shall have proved the Sensism of Locke. 
But first let us continue with Locke's analysis of our 
cognoscitive powers. 
Locke categorizes all our ideas in a twofold manner. Some 
he calls simple ideas, others complex. Simple ideas are those 
which are furnished to the understanding, by sensation and re-
flection, the understanding remaining entirely passive. He will 
enumerate four classes of simple ideas. 
Some simple ideas come into the understanding by one sense 
alone. To this class belong the ideas of color, taste, light, 
sound, odor, solidity, roughness, hardness, etc. The ideas of 
this class are indeed very numerous, and Locke intends to set 
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down only a few of them. 
"I think it will be needless to enumerateall 
the particular simple ideas belonging to each 
sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would, 
there being a great many more of them belonging 
to most of the senses than we have names for.nl2 
To the second class belong those ideas which are conveyed 
into the mind by more than one sense. To this class belong the 
ideas of space, extension, figure, rest, and motion. 
To the third class belong the ideas which are had from re-
flection only. 
"The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the 
foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns 
its view inward upon itself, and observes its 
own actions about these ideas it has, takes 
from thence other ideas, which are capable to 
the objects of its contemplation as any of those 
it has received from foreign things. "13 
Locke instances the ideas of thought and will as examples 
of this class, for these are the tv.'o principal acts of the mind. 
"The two great and principal actions of the mind 
are these two: 'Perception or thinking, and vol-
ition, or willing.tnl~ 
To the fourth class of simple ideas belong those ideas 
which come into the understanding by all the ways of sensation 
and reflection. Thus we have the ideas of pleasure or delight, 
and its opposite, pain or uneasiness, power, existence, and 
unity. 
"There be other simple ideas vvhich convey them-
selves into the mind by all the ways of sensa-
tion and reflection, viz., Delight or Pleasure, 
and its opposite, Pain or Uneasiness, Power, 
Existence, Unity.nl5 
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Complex ideas are those which the understanding "makes" 
by repeating, comparing, and combining simple ideas. 
"When the understanding is at once stored 
with these simple ideas, it has the power 
to repeat, compare, and unite them, even 
to an almose infinite variety; and so can 
make at pleasure nevv complex ideas. trl6 
However Locke will reduce these complex ideas to three 
classes. Some he will call modes, others substance, and others 
relations. 
"Complex ideas, however compounded and de-
compounded, though their number be infinite, 
and the variety endless wherewith they fill 
and entertain the thoughts of men, yet I 
think they may be all reduced under these 
three heads: 1. Modes; 2. Substances; 
3. Relations.nl7 
By modes Locke understands those complex ideas which con-
tain not in themselves the supposition of existing by themselves, 
but are considered as dependencies of substances. .According as 
these combinations are made of the same simple idea or of diff-
erent ideas we have simple or mixed modes. Thus for example 
"surface" is a simple mode resulting from the modification of 
the idea of duration, and memory a simple mode of thinking, etc. 
Sacrilege would be a mixed mode made up of the simple ideas of 
action, circumstance, and motive. Likewise beauty would b.e a 
mixed mode resulting from the simple ideas of color, figure, 
and order. 
The second class of complex ideas are substances. 
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Historians of philosophy are not all in agreement as to what 
Locke meant by substance. However, most of the controversy 
concerns the reality of substance, o point which does not con-
cern us here. ~~at we wish to determine is this. Is the idea 
of substance merely a compound of simple ideas? The answer 
must be affirmative if we are to accept the following words: 
"The ideas of substa.nces are such combinations 
of simple ideas, as are taken to represent 
distinct particular things subsisting by them-
selves; in which the supposed or confused idea 
of substance, such as it is always the first 
and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the 
simple idea of a certain dull whitish color 
with certain degrees of weight, hardness, 
ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of 
lead •••• Now of substances also there are two 
sorts of ideas; one of sir~le substance, as 
they exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; 
the other of several of those put together, as 
an army of men or a flock of sheep; which 
collective ideas of several substances thus put 
together are as much each of them ope single 
idea, as that of a man, or a unit.nl8 
It is true that Locke elsewhere states: "the idea of 
substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflec-
18 
tion." However, this is just another of those inexplicable 
contradictories found in LocKe's Essay. Thus we can under-
stand why Professor Morris, translator of Ueberweg's "History 
of Philosophy", from the German into the English, has this 
criticism to make: 
"Locke's very desire for plainness and intelli-
gibility has rendered his style, by universal 
admission,loose and inexact, not to mention 
colorless prolixity in him ••• and has conse-
quently made his reasonil16 obscure and his con-
clusions uncertain.~~2_0 ________________________________ ~ 
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Locke will distinguish three kinds of substances bodily, 
spiritual and divine. Moreover, he will maintain that our 
idea of spiritual substance is just as clear as that of bodily 
substance. For we have as clear an idea of thought as of ex-
tension, and of will as of force. The idea of divine substance 
is merely the complex idea of existence, power knowledge, etc. 
to which is added the idea of infinite. The idea of infinite 
is obtained by the addition of finite to finite. 
The third class of complex ideas are relations. A rela-
tion, Locke tells us, arises in the mind, 
"Vvben the mind so considers one thing that 
it does as it were, bring it to, and set it 
by another, and carries its view from the one 
to the other,n21 
For him relations are innumerable. However, he discusses 
only the principle relations such as those of cause and effect, 
identity, and diversity, and moral relations. 
Let us recall what we purposed at the beginning of this 
chapter, namely, to point out the sensism in Locke's philosophy. 
Thus far we have merely summarized his ideogeny with scarcely 
any comment. Now we wish to show explicitly that all the ideas 
mentioned by Locke are merely sensuous. 
We have already established the fact that all our ideas 
according to Locke, come to us by the cha1mels of sensation 
and reflection. Are all of these ideas sensuous? That is the 
question we wish to answer now. 
,..-· 
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That the ideas of sensation are sensuous needs little 
proof. We must bear in mind that for Locke the intellect is 
entirely passive. 
"These simple ideas when offered to the mind, 
the understanding can no more refuse to have, 
nor alter v.hen they are imprinted than a mir-
ror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the i::nages 
or ideas, ,-J~:hich objects set before it do there 
produce. '' ~~ 
If, therefore, the intellect in no way changes the sense 
impressions such impressions received in the intellect are no 
different than when they existed in the sense, even though 
we may then call them "Ideas". 
Moreover, Locke explicitly calls these ideas obtained · 
through sensations, "sensations". 
"Thus the perception which hCtually accompanies 
and is annexed to any impression on the body 
made by an external object furnishes the mind 
with a distinct idea which we call 'sensation'; 
which is as it were the actual entrance of agy 
idea into the understanaing by the senses.n23 
Are the ideas obtained by reflection sensuous? There 
seems to be no doubt about this. Let us recall his definition 
of reflection. In the second book of the Essay he tells us 
that it is "the perception of the operations of our minds with-
24 
in us, as it is employed about ideas got by sensation." 
From such a definition we may legitimately reason thus: 
A faculty's nature is knovm by the nature of its operation. 
Furthermore, the nature of an operation is disclosed to us by 
its object. Therefore the nature of a faculty is manifested by 
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its object. We must bear in mind, however, that it is the 
formal object, and not the material object which discloses the 
nature of a faculty •. 
Let us apply this reasoning to our case. The faculty of 
reflection is employed about the operations of the mind which 
in turn are about the ideas 50t by sensation: 
"In time the mind comes to reflect on its o~n 
operations about the ideas got by sensation 
and thereby stores itself with a new set of 
ideas, which I call ideas of reflection.n25 
The ideas of sensation are sensuous a.s we have shown above. 
The operstions of the mind about these ideas are operations of 
combining, comparing and so forth. Combining and comparing 
constitute the form~: .. l object of the operations of thE mind. 
But certainly combining and comparing sensuous ideas are sen-
suous operations. The perception of these operations must also 
be a sensuous function. But reflection is nothing else than thE 
perception of these operations. Therefore, reflection is a sen-
suous faculty. The ideas of reflection must also be sensuous, 
since Locke has explicitly warned us of the passivity of the 
understanding in the formation of simple ideas. Because of 
this passivity the mind can in no way immaterialize the ideas 
it receives. 
Moreover, Locke explicitly calls reflection an internal 
sense. 
"This source of ideas (reflection) every man 
-13-
has within himself, and though it be not a 
sense as having nothing to do with external 
objects yet it is very like it, and might n 
properly enough be called 'internal sense.t~6 
Thus far, it is evident that all simple ideas are sensuous 
ideas. But what about complex ideas? Are they too sensuous? 
They are, and it is evident if we keep in mind Locke's defini-
tion of them, and the fact that the intellect for him is en-
tirely passive. Complex idess are those which the understanding 
"makes" by repeatirle;;, com-paring, and combining simple ideas. 
"When the understanding is at once stored 
witn these simple ideas, it has the power 
to repeat, compare, and unite them, even 
to an almost infinite variety: a.nd sp7cr:.n make at pleasure new complex ideas."~::: 
The "making" of the tm.derstanding in the formation of com-
plex ideas is by no means an action similia.r to the abstraction 
of the active.intellect of the scholastics. It is merely a 
grouping together of simple ideas which are sensuous. Thus 
the complex ideas of Locke must be said to be of the same na-
ture as the simple ideas, that is sensuous. 
There is one pc..ssage in Locke's Ess~q which is sweeping 
indication of his sensism. It is found in the fourth book. 
"Everyman's reasoning and knowledge is only 
about the ideas existing in his own mind, 
which are truly, every one of them particular 
existences. And our knowledge and reasoning 
about other things is only as they correspond 
with these particular ideas. So that the 
perception of the agreement or disagreement 
of our particular is the whole and utmost of 
all our knowledge. Universality is but &cci-
dental to it, and consists only in this, that 
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the particular ideas about which it is ere 
such as more than one particulc..r thing can 
correspond wi'th it and be represented by. tr28 
In this passage Locke clearly states that all our ideas 
represent particular existences. But sense faculties are suf-
ficient to account for such a type of knowledge. Therefore, 
Locke, in his explanation of the cognosci ti ve process·es of man, 
leaves no place for a spiritual faculty. 
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CHAPTER II 
RELATED THOMISTIC DOCTRINE 
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the doctrine of 
the angelic doctor, concerning human knowledge, not however in 
its entirety, but only as regards those points on which Locke 
has discoursed,or points closely related to them. Thus we 
shall be able to criticize Locke in our Third Chapter, in the 
light of the doctrine herein contained. 
The following points we deem necessary and sufficient to 
explain, for our purpose: 
1. Immateriality is the root of knowledge. 
2. The nature of the intellect. 
· 3. The difference between intellective knowledge 
and sensitive knowledge. 
4. The dependence of the intellect on the sense. 
1. IMMATERIALITY IS THE ROOT OF KNOWLEDGE 
It is a very frequent assertion of St. Thomas that imma-
teriality is the root of knowledge. In fact he rarely speaks 
of knowledge without in some way either explicitly or implieitl 
conveying this idea to his readers. It matters not whether he 
is considering knowledge from the part of the knower or the 
object known, for him it is still true to say that immaterialit 
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is the root of knowledge. Let us now consider this principle, 
first as regards the knower and then as regards the object 
known. 
In the "De Veritate" we are told that knowledge is not at-
tributed to all things but only to immaterial beings. 
"Cognitio non omnibus rebus attribuitur sed 
solum immaterialibus.n29 
Immateriality is here taKen in the sense of eminence above 
potentiality in the reception of forms. Potentielity in receiv-
ing forms consists in this, that by the reception the form is de-
termined, anda third entity arises composed from the potential 
and the form or the act. Thus when prime matter receives form 
we have a compound, namely the actuated or informed matter. 
Likewise when wax receives some accidental form it receives it 
in a potential manner. It is as a potency actuated by a form. 
Such a reception of form can be called a potential, subjective, 
imperfect, or material reception of form. 
In knowledge the form of the thing known is not received in 
that way. It is received in a superior or more perfect manner. 
No third entity arises. The knower and the known do not combine 
to form a third. However the knower becomes the known, but re-
mains itself and at the same time leaves the object in its 
"otherness". This is what .M. Maritain styles "an apparent scan-
30 
dal to the principle of identity." And indeed the scandal can 
only be apparent. For we must distinguish between the order of 
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knowledge or intentional order, and the physical order. The 
knower becomes the known in the intentional order. The knower 
and the known remain themselves in the physical, or natural or-
der. It is only in the intentional order that the Thomistic 
31 
dictum "Intellectus in actu est intellectum in &ctu", is true. 
Because this union between subject and object is identity, 
Averroes reckons it greater than the union between matter and 
32 
form, to which Saint Thomas would subscribe. 
Since such a manner of receiving forms is opposed to the 
preceding way which was termed potential, subjective, imperfect, 
or material, we may describe this manner of reception as actual, 
objective, perfect, or immaterial. To receive a form thus, i.e. 
immaterially, supposes that that which receives be removed from 
potentiality or materiality. Hence Aquinas sums up his entire 
doctrine in the brief dictum: 
33 
"Immateriality is the root of knowledge." 
If such is the case, it will be true also that the degree 
of knowledge is proportionate to the immateriality of a being. 
Hence logically the angelic doctor writes: 
"Secundum gro.dum immaterialitatis est gradus 
cognitionis. n34 
We find, therefore, descending cognoscitive powers in God, 
angels, man and animal, because of their descending degree of 
immateriality. 
That such ideas are Thomistic may be easily seen from a 
-18-
perusal of that article in the Summa in which St. Thomas wishes 
to demonstrate that there is knowledge in God. His conclusion 
is that the highest degree of knowledge must be predicated of 
God precisely because he is in the highest degree of immateri-
ality: 
" •••• intelligent beings are distinguished from 
non-intelligent beings because the latter possess 
only their own form; whereas the intelligent 
being naturally has also the form of some other 
thing; for the idea of the thing known is in 
the knower. Hence it is manifest that the na-
ture of a no~-intelligent being is more con-
tracted and limited; whereas the nature of in-
telligent beings has a greater amplitude and 
extension; therefore the Philosopher says that 
the soul is in a sense everything. The con-
traction of the form comes from the matter. 
Hence, as we have said above, forms accordingly 
as they are the more immaterial, approach more 
nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore, it is 
clear that the immateriality of a thing is the 
reason and rule of its cognoscibility: and the 
mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. 
Hence as the Philosopher says, plants do not 
know because they are wholly material. Sense 
knows in proportion as it receives images free 
from matter, and the intellect is still further 
cognoscitive, because it is more separated from 
matter, and unmixed. Since God is in the high-
est degree of immateriality, it follows that He 
occupies the highest place in knowledge.n35 
Immateriality, therefore,for St. Thomas, is the root of 
knowledge in the sense that it is the formal constitutive rea-
son of knowledge. In other words, to say a power receives forms 
not as a potency actuated by them but as act receives act is the 
same to say that it knows. 
Immateriality can be called the root of knowledge also on 
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the part of the object. For to be known, for St. Thomas, is to 
be received as act in act or form in form. The purely potentialJ 
being devoid of act, cannot be known in as much as it is poten-
tial. The material, and potential are here regarded as the 
same. Hence 'it is true that immateriality is the reason of 
knowledge, on the part of the object known. 
That, this is the doctrine of St. Thomas is evident from 
his many articles an the question of knowledge. He rejects the 
doctrine of Empedocles precisely on this ground. Empedocles 
has maintained that the soul was composed of t.he four elements. 
Since like was known by like and all things were made up of the 
elements, it followed that the soul knew all things. Such a 
doctrine was false, according to St. Thomas because: 
n ••• in the material principle of which they 
spoke, the various results do not exist save 
in potential! ty. But a thing is. not known 
according as it is in potentiality, but only 
according as it is in act •••• wherefore nei-
ther is a power known except through its act.n36 
When speaking of the cognoscibility of prime matter he will 
maintain that it can not be known by itself because everything 
which is known is known by its act or form and prime matter is 
considered as devoid of all form. 
"Materia prima non potest sciri per seipsam, 
cum omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscatur per 
suam formam, materia autem prima consideratur 
subjecta omni forma.n37 
Moreover, not even in God is there an idea of prime matter 
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distinct from form, not because of any imperfection in God, but 
because of the impossibility of the potential being understood 
in itself. 
"Si proprie de idea loquamur, non potest poni 
quod materia prima per se habeat ideam in Deo 
distinctam ab idea formae vel compositi quia 
idea proprie dicta respicit rem secundum quod 
est producibilis in esse; materia autem non 
potest exire in esse sine forma.n38 
Again when speaking of God's comprehension of himself, he 
says that God knows himself in as much as He is knowable be-
cause the reason of His knowability is His actuality which is 
the rea~;on of His cog no sci ti ve power. 
"For everything is knowable according to the 
mode of its own actuality. A thing is not 
known as potentiality but as actuality. 
The power of God's own knowledge is as great 
as His actual existence; because from the 
fact that He is Actuality separated from all 
matter and potentialit~9He is knowable in a corresponding degree." 
2. THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECT 
Locke, as we have seen wasinsistent on the fact that the 
understanding is passive. St. Thomas will agree with him, but 
will remind us that there is also an active power in the intell-
ect. It is from a study of these two phases of the intellect 
that we may grasp its nature according to St. Thomas' explana-
tion. 
The intellect is, first of all a passive power. ·st. Thomas 
will be careful to point out that to be passive may be taken in 
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three ways. 
"Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from 
a thing is taken something which belongs to 
it by virtue either of its nature, or of its 
proper inclin~tion; as when water loses cool-
ness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill 
or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is 
said to be passive, when something, whether 
suitable or unsuitable is taken away from it. 
And in this way not only he who is ill is said 
to be passive, but also he who is healed; not 
only he who is sad but also he who is joyful; 
or whatevery way he be altered or moved. Third-
ly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, 
from the very fact that what is in potentiality 
to something receives that to which it was in 
potentiality, without being deprived of anything. 
And accordingly whatever passes from potentiality 
to act, may be said to be passive, even when it 
is perfected. And thus with us to understand 
is to be passive.n4Q 
But he will determine more minutely this passivity of the 
human intellect by comparing it with the divine and angelic in-
tellect. The intellect has an operation extending to universal 
being. Now the divine intellect is related to universal being 
in as much as it is the act of all being. For all beings pre-
exists in the Divine Essence, as in its first cause. Therefore, 
41 
the divine intellect is not in potentiality but is pure act. 
But every created intellect is compared to intelligible things 
as a potentiality to act. Now we may distinguish between a pot-
entiality which is always perfected by its act, and one that is 
not, but proceeds from potentiality to act. The first is the 
case with the angelic intellect, v.hich is always in act as re-
gards those things which it can n~turally understand. The 
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The second is the case with the human intellect, which is in 
the beginning like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, 
42 
to use Aristotle's example, and gradually actually understands 
sueh is the passivity of the human intellect according to Saint 
43 
Thomas. 
However, for St. Thomas as we have said, the intellect is 
not only a passive power. There is also what he terms an active 
intellect. In this he completely parts company with Locke. 
The reason for positing an active intellect is because St. 
Thomas rejected the Platonic doctrine of the existence of sub-
sisting forms and followed Aristotle who did not allow that 
forms of natural things exist apart from matter. Forms exist-
ing in matter are not actually intelligible, because immaterial-
ity is the root of knowledge. However, the intellect is passive 
and must be acted upon by its object. On the other hand, noth-
ing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in 
act. Hence there must be some active intellective power to make 
the object of the intellect actually intelligible. This power 
44 
is the active intellect of the angelic doctor. There is no 
need for an active sense, since the sensible things are found 
45 
in act outside the soul. Such an intellect was unnecessary 
for Plato, for whom the universals (direct) are in act outside 
46 
the mind. 
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3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Locke, as we have seen, confused the image and the notion, 
from which it followed that the sense and the intellect were not 
radically different. st. Thomas on the other hand, will utilize 
almost every occasion possible to point out a difference between 
sense and intellect. For him, they agree only in this that both 
are cognoscitive and not appetitive faculties. 
They differ first of all as regards their object. The 
sense has for its object singular things, while the intellect 
apprehends universals abstracted from their material surrounding • 
"Sensus non est cognoscitivus nisi singularium; 
cognoscit enim omnis sensitiva potentia per 
species individuales, cum recipiat species 
rerum in organis corporalibus. Intellectus 
autem est cognoscitivus universalium.n47 
Moreover the senses are concerned only with the material, 
while the intellect can know the immaterial, not of course per-
fectly and in themselves but ·imperfectly and by means of mater-
ial things. 
"From material things we can rise to some kind of 
knowledge of immaterial things but not to the 
perfect knowledge thereof.n48 
The sense cannot know its own act. But the act of the 
sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect can know 
its own act. Therefore, they are different: 
"The proper sense feels by reason of the change 
in the material organ caused by the external 
sensible. A material object, however, cannot 
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make a change in itself; but one material object 
is changed by another, and therefore the act of 
the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. 
The intellect on the contrary, does not perform 
the act of understanding by the material cha~e 
of an organ; and so there is no comparison.n49 
Moreover the sense may be damaged by a sensible object 
which is too powerful for the senses. A terrific explosion ren-
ders men deaf.; an intensely bright light renders th.em blind. 
The intellect, on the contrary, is never corrupted nor damaged 
by the excellence of its object. Not even the idea of God is 
too strong for it. In fact he who knows greater things is bet-
ter able to know the lesser things. For example, thanks to the 
knowledge of a principle of philosophy Aristotle was able to 
see a multitude of conclusions which the untrained philosopher 
would fail to see after many examples. 
"Sensus corrumpitur ab excellenti sensibili. 
Intellectus autem non corrumpitur ab excellen-
tia intellie,ibilis; quinimmo qui intelligit 
majora potest melius postmodum minora intelli-
gere. Est igitur alia virtus sensitiva et 
intellectiva.n50 
Moreover for St. Thomas intellect has for its subject the 
soul alone, whereas the senses are faculties of body and soul. 
51 
They operate through corporeal organs. In this he differs from 
Plato who made the sensitive operation, an operation of the soul 
52 
alone. 
Another difference, consequent to the preceding, is that 
the intellective powers actually remain in the soul after death, 
53 
while the sensitive powers remain only virtually. 
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With such statements we readily see that the angelic. doctor 
is at the opposite pole from Locke, regarding 'the relation be-
tween sense and intellect. 
4. THE DEPENDENCE OF THE INTELLECT ON THE SENSE 
Thus far we have seen that for St. Thomas, the intellect 
is different from the sense and superior to it. However the 
superiority of the human intellect over the senses is not such 
that there is no dependence of intellect on the senses. 
54 
In the "Summa" he devotes a whole article to this ques-
tion asking whether or not intellectual knowledge is derived 
from sensible things. He takes a stand midway between Democ-
ritus and Plato, following the course of Aristotle. Democritus 
has held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images. He 
did not distinguish between sense and intellect. Consequently, 
even intellectue.l knowledge was caused in this way. Plato, on 
the other hand, held that intellect is distinct from the senses. 
In fact so wide was the'gap between intellect and sense for Plat 
that intellectual knowledge does not proceed from sensitive know 
ledge. The intellect for him knows by participation of separate 
intelligible forms. The senses are, at the most, occasions of 
intellectual knowledge. 
St. Thomas on the one hand will agree with Democritus that 
the sensible things are the causes of intellectual knowledge. 
However they are not the total or perfect cause, otherwise 
~--------------------, 
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sense and intellect would be on the same plane. It is here that 
the angelic doctor leans towards Plato in making the sense and 
intellect different. He will not go as far as Plato however in 
making sensible things the mere occasions of intellecual know-
ledge but will call them the imperfect cause. The other cause 
of intellectUa.l knovvledge is the active intellect. 
"Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause 
of intellectual knowledge. And, therefore, 
it is not stranoe that intellectual knowledge 55 
should extend further than sensitive knowledge." 
In the "De Veritate" he tells us that he finds this opinion 
more reasonable which places intellective knowledge to be caused 
partly by sensible things and partly from something separated 
from matter. 
"Rationabilior videtur sententia Philosoph! 
qui ponit scientiam mentis nostrae partim 
ab intrinseco esse, partim ab extrinseco; 
non solum a rebus a materia separatis, sed 
etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus.n56 
The dependence of the intellect on the phantasms is great-
er than its dependence on exterior sensible things. For, it de-
pends on exterior sensible things only to acquire knowledge, but 
it needs the concurrence of the phantasms to actually know that 
knowledge which it has already acquired. St. Thomas will sup-
57 
port this doctrine with a posteriori and a priori proofs. If 
it were not the case, our actual intellective knowledge would 
not be impeded by a lesion of the corporeal organs. Experience 
testifies to this hindrance. Moreover we know from our own ex-
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perience that when we want to understand something we form phan-
tasms by way of examples in which we examine what we are desir-
ous of understanding. 
His a priori proof is to this effect: The proper object of 
the human intellect is the quiddity existing in corporeal mat-
ter. For the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing 
known and the human intellect is a form united to a body. Such 
a nature exists only in an individual, and hence cannot be com-
pletely known except in the individual. But we apprehend the 
individual through the senses and the imagination. Hence for 
the intellect to understand actually its proper object it must 
turn to the phantasm in order to perceive the universal nature 
existing in the individual. 
This of course would not be the case, he reminds us, if the 
natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual 
58 
as the Platonists held. 
~us for St. Thomas the human intellect does depend on the 
senses. However, the dependence is an objective or extrinsic 
dependence, in the sense, that the intellect obtains its object 
from the senses. It is by no means a subjective or intrinsic 
dependence. 
Thus far we have merely presented in an expository fashion 
the sensism of Locke and the intellectualism of St. Thomas. We 
now proceed to a criticism of this doctrine of Locke in the 
light of the Thomistic teachings. 
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CHAPTER III 
A CRITIQUE OF LOCKE'S SENSISM 
As we forewarned in our introduction to this thesis, many 
criticisms which we could make of Locke's Sensism, have already 
! 
been brought forward and developed by St. Thomas in his rejectioD 
of similar errors and treatment of kindred subjects. In the 
preceding chapter a number of such te~ts have been cited from 
the works of the angelic doctor. 
In this chapter, therefore, we shall indeed criticize 
Locke's Sensism in the light of Thomistic doctrine. However, 
we do not deem it necessary to develop all the reasons for the 
rejection of Locke's doctrine, but think it sufficient to point 
out these reasons. Otherwise we would be indulging 1n some 
unnecessary repetition. 
The philosophy of St. Thomas is based on objective evidence. 
That is the reason for its merits. Now it should be clear to 
any open minded person that we, with our intellects, can per-
ceive immaterial objects. Thus we can grasp or understand what 
virtue is, what wisdom is, and so forth. Logic demands that the 
faculty which perceives such object be itself immaterial. In 
an explanation of the intellectual process, therefore, we must 
save the intellect's immateriality. 
r....----------, 
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0n the other hand the objects of our experience are mater-
ial. The Platonic doctrine which teaches the existence of im-
material, and consequently intelligible forms, is an unwarranted 
assumption. 
A true doctrine of the intellective process must, therefore, 
explain how the intellect receives its knowledge from the mater-
ial and sensible, leaving at the same time the immateriality of 
the intellect intact. 
It is precisely on this point that the Lockian doctrine 
may be called false, and the teaching of St. Thomas true. 
As we have seen, Locke does, indeed, maintain that our know-
ledge begins in the senses. Here he is in perfect accor.d with 
St. Thomas. But in the next step he falters. That which is in 
the sense passes to the intellect without any change. 
"These simple ideas when offered to the mind, the 
understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter 
when they are imprinted, than a mirror can refuse, 
alter, or obliterate the images or ideas, which 
objects set before it do there produce.n 59 
The idea, therefore, will differ from the image, only ac-
cidentally. How then can we uphold the immateriali~y of the 
intellect, without disregarding logic? 
St. Thomas, as we have seen, will admit another power, 
which he calls the active intellect to extricate us from this 
dilemma. The active intellect will immaterialize the material 
1n the Phantasm. It will illuminate, so to speak, the immater-
ial and leave the material in darkness. This immaterial part, 
~~--------------------------------~ 
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or the essence of the material will then proceed to act upon 
the intellect. Thus the immateriality of the intellect is safe-
guarded. 
Hence it is that Locke is wrong in insisting on the fact 
that the intellect is entirely passive. 
It is clear, also, that we must not exaggerate the depend-
ence of the intellect on the sense. For if the intellect is tot-
ally dependent on the sense for its operation, it must likewise 
be dependent on it, for its existence. In such a case it would 
no longer be immaterial. 
As was explained, St. Thomas, while he must speak of some 
dependence of the intellect upon the sense is careful to point 
out that this dependence is only an objective or extrinsic one, 
by no means an intrinsic or subjective dependence. Locke, on 
the other hand, makes use of no such distinction, but leads his 
readers to believe that the intellect is totally dependent on 
the sense. 
In Locke's essay there is no clean cut distinction between 
image and idea, nor sense and intellect, while in St. Thomas' 
writings their difference is unfolded from all angles. Hence 
from Locke's writings one would easily conclude that they were 
of the same nature, but from Aquinas' doctrine there would 
follow no such confusion. 
Locke's reduction of the intellectual powers of man to the 
level of the senses is evident to any unbiased critic. Such a 
~~----------------~ 
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verdict is the common opinion of historians. Thus Fr. Mahoney 
writes: 
seen. 
"The English mentality of Locke on the contrary, 
which is wedded to the concrete, individual, sen-
suous "ideasn, made mown by sense experience, 
and which are valid in so far as they can be 
tested by sense experience, tends to emphasize 
unduly sense knowledge, and minimize, if it does 
not deny outright, intellectual knowledge. Hence 
Lock repudiates the innate ideas of Descartes. 
Thus the idea of •substance", because it is 
directly and nper sen supersensible, Locke rele-
gates to the realm of the "unknown". It is 
something merely supposed or imagined, because, 
forsooth, it is not an object nper se" of sense. 
"Species", •notion" and phantasm he included under 
the same category, that is he calls them by the 
same name - "ideasn. Consequently he judges them 
to be of the same nature, and thus wipes out the 
clear-cut, traditional distinction, between 
intellectual (species, notion) and sensuous 
"ideas" (phantasm) ••••• Those statements of Locke 
dispose of all intellectual knowledge in man, and 
make of him only an animal. Extremes beget 
extremes. Thus would Descartes make man an angel 
and Lockea glorified an1mal."60 
Fraser, one of the editors of Locke's Essay, comments thus: 
"Locke fails to distinguish between ideas as sense-
phenonena, and ideas as concepts and meanings.•61 
That such a doctrine has very serious consequences is easily 
It destroys science. Science is of the universal. Sensism 
destroys all knowledge of the universal. When the scientist 
says: "Oxygen aids ignition" or "Fire burns" he is stating a 
truth which is true not only now but also in the future. For 
science professes to know what will happen in the future. How-
ever, sense-experience cannot transcend the past and the present. 
r~------------~ 
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No one can sensuously experience the future. Thus sensism is 
fatal to science. 
Moreover if all our knowledge is of the sensitive order the 
intellect must be said to have the same nature as the sense. 
Hence we would have to say that it was essentially dependent on 
the material. But what is essentially dependent on the material 
is material: Hence the human soul could not be called spiritual 
Consequently it would be destroyed with the body and hence not 
immortal. 
From a denial of the immortality of the soul, many perverse 
conclusions ensue. Morals would easily be lowered. For it is 
the rendering of account of their deeds in the next life which 
keeps many men on the right path. 
Furthermore, if the soul were not spiritual there would be 
no liberty in man. For free will belongs only to one having 
power to know the universal, i.e. a spiritual nature. And, of 
course, the abolition of liberty brings with it a degradation of 
morals. Thus we see that a doctrine such as Locke proposed has 
far-reaching serious consequences. 
Locke, himself saw that his explanation of the cognoscitive 
processes was sensistic. For, in one passage, he maintains that 
matter may be conceived as thinking. 
"For I see no contradiction in it, that the first 
Eternal thjnking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should 
if ae pleased give to certain systems of created 
senseless matter, put together as He thinks fit, 
s·ome degrees of sense, perception and thought.•62 
r~--------------~ 
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He seems to believe that it would be derogatory to God to 
say that He could not make thinking matter. But we answer, that 
in this case we are not lessening God's power. For such a being 
cannot be, just as a square circle: A thinking substance can 
reflect totallY upon itself, a material substance evidently can 
not. Hence a material and thinking substance have contradictory 
attribUes from which it is legitimate to conclude that their 
atures are contradictory since "operatic sequitur esse." Locke 
63 
ill add that since we do not know all the properties of matter, 
e should not maintain that it is impossible for it to think. 
But, of course it is not necessary to know all the properties of 
matter to say what is contradictory to it. We know that you 
cannot gather oranges from thorns, although we know not exhaust-
ively the nature of that plant. In a similar manner, since we 
know contradictory attributes of thought and matter, we can 
truthfully say that thinking-matter is repugnant in terms. 
Despite the fact that his premises logically led to a denial 
of the spirituality of the soul, Locke always upheld it, thus 
meriting the criticism of a modern historian: 
"His Essay ••••••• is teeming with contradictions 
and inconsistencies."64 
SECTION II ATTEMPTED REALISM OF LOCKE 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EXPOSITION OF LOCKE'S ATTEMPTED REALISM. 
Our aim in this chapter is not to criticize, but to expose. 
~ust as in the first chapter we brought forth passages from 
Locke's Essay in which his Sensism was explicitly and implicitly 
contained, in a like manner in this chapter we purpose to set 
forth other passages in which his futile attempts at realism are 
f~d. 
The first indication of his Idealism* is found in his defi-
nition of "idean, in which also, strange to say, we noticed his 
sensism. After telling us about the occasion of his inquiry 
into human understanding, he continues: 
"before I proceed on to what I have thought on 
this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon 
of my reader for the frequent use of the word, 
'idea', which he will find in the following 
treatise it being that term, which I think, 
serves best to stand for whatever is the object 
of the understanding when a man thinks. I 
have used it to express whatever is meant by 
phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which 
the mind can be employed about in thinking: 
and I could not avoid frequently using 1t."65 
Again: 
"All our knowledge consists in the view the mind 
has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light 
and greatest certainty we with our faculties and 
in our way of knowledge are capable of.n66 
* i.e. According to our contention. Professedly he was a realist. 
-~5-
The same doctrine is contained in the definition of know-
ledge which he lays down for us: 
"Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the 
perception of the connexion of and agreement or 
disagreement and repugnancy of, any of our ideas. 
In this alone it consists.n67 
The most explicit statement is perhaps the following: 
·nThe mind hath no other immediate object but its 
own ideas which it alone does or can contemplate.n6S 
If such is the case, one would logically say that we would 
never be able to know anything outside of our ideas. A modern 
scholastic picturesquely describes the predicament thus: 
"What can be constructed from 'ideas' but an 
edifice of ideas, no matter how you manipulate them. 
Suppose there were no other material or commodity 
on earth for man to work upon but wood, then all 
his efforts could not make anything except out of 
wood. In like manner if as Locke says the only 
material of knowledge given to man, out of which 
he is to construct all his knowledge, are 'ideas• 
then out of the material of those ideas he cannot 
fashion anything except other ideas. All his judgments and reasoning will be confined, like a 
squirrel in a cage, within the realm of ideas. Hence 
the whole round of existing things outside the 
closed circle of ideas - matter, other human 
beings, soul, God, etc. - will be shut out from 
the range of his knowledge; he will be doomed 
forever to gaze, like a maniac at his own ideas.•69 
We would be wrong to think that Locke never recognized this 
difficulty. For he explicitly te-lls us: 
•our knowledge, ther~tore is real only in so far 
as there is confort6.i ty between our ideas and the 
reality of things. But what shall be here the 
criterion? How shall the mind when it perceives 
nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with 
things themselves. This seems not to want 
difticult:y."70 
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Locke will now proceed to solve the difficulty. He will 
begin to explain how we do come to a knowledge of reality. His 
reasons are multiple. We will set forth a few of them, in 
simply an expository manner reserving our criticism of them to 
the last chapter. 
His first reason is based on the Will of God and the prin-
ciple of causality. He will consider first simple ideas. 
"The first are simple ideas, which since the 
mind, as has been shown can by no means make to 
itself, must necessarily be the product of 
things operating on the mind in a natural way, 
and producing therein those perceptions which 
by the wisdom and will of Our Maker they are 
ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, 
that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, 
but the natural and regular productions of things 
without us really operating upon us and so carry 
with them all the conformity which is intended 
or which our state requires; for they represent 
to us things under those appearances which they are 
fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enables 
to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, 
to discern the states they are in, and so to take 
them for our necessities and apply them to our 
uses------and this conformity between our simple 
ideas and the existence of things is sufficient 
for real ·knowledge."71 
As regards complex ideas, all of them except the idea of 
substance ca1a1ot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. 
"All our complex ideas, except those of substance, 
being archetypes of the mind's own making, not 
intended to be the copies of any thing nor 
referred to the existence of any thing, as to 
their originals, cannot want any conformity 
necessary to real knowledge."72 
Another argument Which Locke uses to solve this difficulty 
can be termed the argument from the vividness of ideas of 
sensation. The argument is contained in the following paragraph: 
"There can be nothing more certain than that 
the idea we receive from an external object is 
in our minds. This is intuitive knowledge. 
But whether there be anything more than barely that 
idea in our minds, whether, we can thence cer-
tainly infer the existence of anything without 
us, which corresponds to that idea, is that where 
of some men think there may be a question made; 
because men may have such ideas in their minds, 
when so such thing exists, and no such object 
affects their senses. But yet here, I think, we 
are provided with an evidence that puts us past 
doubting. For I ask anyone, whether he be not 
invincibly conscious to himself of a different 
perception (idea) when he looks at the sun by 
day, and thinks of it by night, when he actually 
tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only 
thinks of that savour or odor? We as plainly 
find the difference there is between any ideas 
received in our minds by our own memory and 
actually coming into our minds by our own senses, 
as we do by any two distinct ideas."73 
A third argument which Locke advances for our knowledge of 
reality is based on the theory of Representative perception. 
In other words he will tell us that we know objects not directly 
in themselves but indirectly. He assumes that ideas are images 
or representations of extra mental objects. Thus he says: 
"The mind knows not things immediately but only 
by the intervention of the ideas it has of 
them."74 
&lmming up we may say that Locke makes the idea the direct 
object of the understanding, in doing which he is simply accept-
~g the postulate of Descartes, with whom he had parted company 
by his sensism. Despite such a promise Locke will attempt to 
~how how we reach reality, and hence he is often correctly 
r 
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termed a "critical realist." The arguments which we have 
selected were those based on the principle of causality and will 
of God, on the vividness of ideas of sensation, and on represent-
~tive perception. After explaining the direct realism of Saint 
~homas, we will criticize this doctrine of Locke. 
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CHA.PTE'R V 
RELATED THOMISTIC DOCTRINE 
Saint Thomas' position as regards the object of th~ und~r­
standing is that of a d1rec~ realist. Instead of saying tha~ 
the id~a is "the object of th~ und~rs~anding wh~n a man thinks", 
as Locke would affirm, he would call it the means by which w~ 
attain to reality itself. He will admit that we know the id~a, 
but only secondarily, indirectly, and by means of reflectlon. 
'l'he idea for the angelic doctor is never tht: direct object of 
~he intellect. 
Th~ difference b~tw~en th~se two notions sums up th~ fund-
amental diff~rence betw~;;en idealism and ·~·homistic realism. As 
Dr. Noel points out this doctrine is "the corner-stone of the 
7b 
critical reoonstruction of philosophy.~~ 
St. Thomas in his writings has taken great pains to make 
clear his doctrine of realism. in ~he Summa h~ has g1v~n a 
whol~ ar~~clv to the problem, asking whether the idea is that 
which we see or that by which we see. He first shows the false 
conclusions which would follow from a theory such as that of 
Locke. First of all science would be concerned with only ideas 
in the soul. 
"Firstly because the things we understand are 
the objects of science; therefore, if what 
we understand is merely the intelligible species 
in the soul, it would follow that every science 
would not be concerned with objects outside 
the soul, but only with the intelligible species 
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within the soul." 
The second false conclusion would be that whatever seems 
is true. 
"For if the faculty lmows its own impression 
only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing 
seems according to the impression made on 
the cognitive faculty. Consequently the 
cognitive faculty will always judge of its 
own impression as such; for instance, if 
taste perceived only its own impression, when 
anyone with a healthy taste perceives that 
honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if 
any one with a corrupt taste perceives that 
honey is bitter this would be equally true; 
for each judge according to his taste. Thus 
every opinion would be equally true; in fact 
every sort of apprehension. 11 77 
The Angelic Doctor now passes to the constructive side and 
continues thus: 
"There is a twofold action, one which remains 
in the agent, for instance, to see and to 
understand, and another which passes into an 
external object, for instance, to heat and 
to cut; and each of these actions proceeds 
in virtue of some form. And as the form from 
which proceeds as action tending to something 
external is the likeness of the object of the 
action, as heat in the heater is a likeness 
of the thing heated; so the form from which 
proceeds an action remaining in the agent is 
the likeness of the object. Hence that by 
which the sightsees is the likeness of the 
visible thing; and the likeness of the thing 
understood, that is, the intelligible species, 
is the form b;r •·;hich the intellect understands. 
But since the intellect reflects upon itself, 
by such reflection it understands both its 
own act of intelligence and the species by 
which it understands. Thus the intelligible 
species is that which is understood secondarily; 
but that which is primarily understood is the 
object, of which the species is the likeness. 11 7t:S 
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Dr. Kremer will call this the essential thesis of direct 
realism: 
"For the ancients and St. Thomas, it is indubi-
table that we lmow, not the representations of 
things but things themselves tvide e.g. Sum. 
theol. l,q. 85, a.2.J; and to know is to have 
this object for the normal end of intentional 
activity. The subjective intermediary which 
serves to make things known is not known by 
us in the first instance; its existence man-
ifestily depending on that primary direct know-
ledge. ·rhis is, in my opinion, the essential 
thesis of "innnediate" or "direct" realism."79 
In many other places St. Thomas also brings this same point 
to the fore. Thus in the Summa again he writes: 
"The stone is that which is known, and not the 
idea of the stone, except indirectly by the 
act of reflection when the intellect turns 
back upon itself, otherwise our knowledge eu 
would be only of ideas, instead of things." 
In the 11De Veritate", he tells us that which is known by 
the intellectual vision are the things themselves and not their 
images or effigies: 
"Ipsa c ognita per intellectual em visionem sunt res ip-
sae et non rerum imagines. rrtU 
In the same work he writes that the object of the intellect 
is the very essence of the thing, although one knows the essence 
through its similitude. 
"0bjectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia, 
quamvis essentiam rei cognoscat per ejus 
similitudinem sicut per medium cognoscendi.n82 
In his work "Summa Contra Gentiles" he writes so much in 
the same vein that there is no doubt left in the reader•s mind 
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concerning his doctrine of realism. Thus he will point out that 
although he has told us that the idea is not that which is 
understood but the means of understanding nevertheless by a cer-
tain reflection the idea is understood. 
"Licet autem di:x:erimus quod species intelligibiles 
in intellectu possibili recepta non sit quod in-
telligitur, sed quo intelligitur, non tamen re-
movetur quin per refle:x:ionem quamdam, intellec-
tus seipsum intelligat et suum intelligere, et 
speciem qua intelligit. n8~ 
The only way the intelligible can be said to be within th~ 
intellect is by the iaea, by which the intellect understands: 
"Intelligibile est intra intellectum quantum ad 
id quo intelligitur."84 
The idea by which the quiddity or essence of a thing is 
understood comprehends the thing in the sense of representing 
it: 
"Omnia intelligibilis species per quam intelli-
gitur quidditas vel essentia alicujus rei com-
prehendit in representando rem illam."t15 
In one of his "Quaestiones Disputatae" he is led to tell us 
the same thing, in other words, When speaking of the divine re-
lations. .!.'here are four elements to be considered in understand-
ing, he will point out: the thing which is understood, -che in-
telligible species by which the intellect is put in act, the act 
of understanding itself and the concept, all of which in man are 
distinct. 
nrntelligens autem in intelligendo ad quattuor 
potest habere ordinem: scilicet, ad rem quae 
intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem quo 
fit intellectus in actu, ad suum ~ntelligere, 
et ad conceptionem intellectus.ntsti 
His commentators will speak in language just as clear. 
John of St. Thomas will say that in the idea the thing is known 
as immediately grasped. 
11 Sed in ipsa immediate res cognita attingitur.nts7 
Sylvester, in his classic commentary on the Summa Contra 
Gentiles, will tell us that in understanding the nature of a 
stone, the understanding terminates at the stone. 
"Intellectio enim qua lapis intelligitur ad 
lapidem terminatur.utsts 
It is quite evident therefore,that for St. Thomas, the idea 
is not that which is understood, but means by which we under-
stand. As Dr. Noel puts it: 
"The real is given us __ straight away in the 
activity of knowing 11 o9 
If some one would ask just what is that thing which is 
directly understood according to St. Thomas, we must answer that 
it is the quiddity of a material thing, Which it abstracts fram 
the phantasms. 
"Objectum intellectus nostri secund1llll praesentem 
statum est quidditas rei materialis quam a 
phantasmatibus abstrahit.tt90 
As regards the nature of this abstraction a sufficient ex-
planation was given in our second chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A CRITIQUE OF LOCKE'S ATTEMPED REALISM 
In the preceding chapter we have seen from St. Thomas' log-
ical reasoning, that if we would say that the object of the un-
derstanding is the idea, at least, two absurdities would follow. 
First, of all science would be only about objects within the 
soul, because the things we understand are the objects of science. 
Again, from this postulate, it would result that every opinion 
is equally true. 
Such a postulate, we have seen, was a part of Lockian 
epistemology. Hence all that St. Thomas has said against it may 
be opposed to Locke's doctrine. 
Lo&e, however, despite his Cartesian premise claimed to be 
a realist and adduced many reasons to bridge the gap be~veen 
thought and reality. 
We shall novv attempt to criticize these different arguments 
which he brought forth, notwithstanding that, as St. Thomas has 
ahown, the feat was an impossible one. 
The first argument which Locke has given in this regard is 
based on the principle of Causality and the Will of God. Things 
produce in us those ideas which they are adapted to, according to 
the will of God. We can truthfully say that such an argument 
fails because of Locke's own account of the nature of cause. 
'Nhen he analyzes the nature of "cause" in the second book of the 
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Essay" he concludes that it is a pure mental creation, having no 
objective value. 
11 So that whatever is considered by us to con-
duce or operate to the producing any particular, 
simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, 
whether substance or mode, which did not before 
exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation 
of a cause and is so denominated bv us. 11 91 
------------------------
If then cause is sofuething purely subjective, a mental relation, 
external objects can never be called causes and be said to reall 
produce in us ideas. 
Moreover Locke in the foregoing proof assumes the activity 
of matter, since he makes matter external to the mind the cause 
of our simple ideas. But when speaking specifically on active 
power he doubts whether or not matter has any active power at 
all. 
"Power is twofold viz. as able to make, or able 
to receive, any change. The one may be called 
active and the other passive power. Whether 
matter may be not wholly destitute of active 
power, as its Author God, is truly above all 
passive power, and whether the intermediate 
state of created spirits be not that alone 
which is capable of both act1•e and Dassive 
power, may be worth consideration."~2 
If he wishes to be consistent, he cannot assume without any 
proof as he does in this argument that external matter has activ-
ity and is a cause in the true sense of the word. 
The second argument which Locke uses to prove our intellec-
tive contact with reality, was based on the vividness of ideas 
of sensation, when compared with t he paleness of ideas of mere 
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imagination and memory. 
The absence of' consistency is quite conspicuous in Locke' 
Essay, and here again it must be noted. In this argument he 
assumes that we receive our ideas from external objects. For 
he begins: 
"There can be nothing more certain than that 
the idea we receive from an external object 
is in our minds. rr~M 
But before, he had said that we know noching but our own ideas. 
How then can he say that we also know that ideas are produced 
by external objects? Moreover in this argument he admits tha~ 
he directly perceived objects outside of' him, contrary to his 
avowed princt ple that all our knowledge, "consists in the view 
the mind has of its own ideas." 
The third argument Which Locke uses to demonstrate our 
knowledge of reality, was bas~d on the fact that ideas are imagef 
or representations of' extra mental objects. Since the ideas are 
known directly the objects which ~hey represent are known in-
directly, is the substance of Locke's reasoning. 
But here again we may ask how can we know that our ideas 
are representative of external objects if all our knowledge con-
sists in the direct perception of our ideas? In order to assert 
that there is a correspondence between two things we must first 
know both of' them. But with Locke only one of' them is known, 
i.e. the idea. To say that the idea is representative of an ex-
r 
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ternal object implies that we know that external object. If 
that is true for Locke then he abandons the principle which he 
had asserted, with so mucl1 infalli~lity, that the idea alone 
is the direct object of our knowledge. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the judgement of two phil-
os ophers of his own .l:!.nglish school. 'l'hus Professor Archibald 
Alexander sums up his study of Locke: 
"The truth is that Locke failed to make the 
transi tlon from the individual to the world, 
or from the world to the individual ••••••• 
All our knowledge is really subjective accor-
ding to Locke, ani human certainty .is relative 
certainty."'t14 
Professor Green gives the following estimate: 
Only if existence w~re itself an idea would the 
consciousness of the agreement of the idea with 
it be a case of knowledge; but to make existence 
an idea is to make the whole question about the 
agreement of ideas, w :ith existence as such, un-
meaning ••••• There can be no assurance of agreemen~ 
between an idea and that which is no object of con-
sciousness at all ••• The raising of the question, 
in fact, as Locke puts it, implies the impossibility 
of answering it. l.t cannot be raised with any 
significance, unless existence 1s external to, and 
o-cher than, an idea.rr95 
And thus we see that these three arguments of Locke can be 
refuted on the grounds of inconsistency. But we must bear in 
mind that Locke was doomed to inevitable failure because of his 
acceptm ce of Descartes idea:t istic postulate. One can never 
arr·ive at realism, by beginning with idealism. Gilson brings 
this out in his criticism of Descartes, Which words can very 
aptly be applied to Locke and which M. Maritain calls "aurea 
dicta. 11 ~ 0 
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ttHe who begins as an idealist ·necessarily 
ends as one: it is impossible to be an 
idealist by halves. There is no need to 
doubt what history teaches by so many ex-
amples •••• No one made a greater effort 
than Descartes did to throw a bridge be-
tween thought and things, basing himself 
on the principle of causality; he was in-
deed the first to make the effort since 
he had obliged himself to do so by placing 
the point of departure of knowledge in in-
tuitive thought: it is therefore strictly 
accurate to say that every scholastic who 
things he is a realist because he accepts 
this setting of the problem is in reality a 
Cartesian •••••• One may begin with Descartes, 
but one will end along tlmt road with Berkely 
or Kant. There is an internal necessity in 
the very essence of metaphysics, and the 
progress of philosophy precisely consists in 
an increasingly clear consciousness of its 
content ••••• No man will ever win from the 
"Cogito" the justg~ication of the realism 
of Saint Thomas." 
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c 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
In the foregoing pages we have seen two errors in the 
epistemology of Locke ably refuted by the teachings of the an-
gelic doctor. First of all we have noted how Locke reduced the 
intellect to the level of the senses, not indeed explicitly, 
but by means of his failure to distinguish between image and 
idea, and his over-exageration of the passivity of the intellect 
Secondly he spoke of the idea as being the direct object of the 
understanding, and then with an attempt which was inevitably 
doomed to failure tried to show how we may grasp reality. Takin1 
these two errors into consideration we may aptly style his doc-
trine an immanent materialism. 
St. Thomas has pointed out the false consequences of such 
a doctrine. The first would reduce us to the level of beasts, 
destroy the immortality and liberty of the soul. The other 
would destroy science and make truth relative. Moreover it 
wo,Jlc'l Mr1:-e the apprehension of reality an impossibility. Hence 
St. 'll.i::omas saw the necessity of admitting a power in the human 
soul such as the active intellect. Hence it is also that he 
would never abandon the truth that we are in immediate contact 
with reality. The idea we know only by reflection. 
Of all the verbal jewels added to the crown of St. Thomas 
perhaps the greatest was the testimony of Pope Innocent the VI: 
11His doctrine above all other doctrine, with the 
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one exception of the Holy Scripture, has such 
a propriety of words, such a method of explan-
ation, such a truth of opinions, that no one 
who holds it will ever be found to have strayed 
from the path of truth; whereas anyone who has 
attackedit has always been suspected as to the 
truth. n~ts 
The truth of this statement results from the fact that the 
doctrine of Aquinas is based on objective evidence. It is not 
the result of any gratuitously assumed, quasi principles. For 
that reason, it is most useful in refuting errors that have 
arisen after his time and will ce helpful in disproving future 
erroneous doctrines. 
Our thesis is an indication, we believe, of how Aquinas' 
doctrine serves to refute the errors of posterity. 
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